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Abstract 
 Local Government finance is of immense importance for a state and 
for the government functions of rendering services to the citizens. Local 
finances reflect the fiscal independence of municipalities and the financial 
capacity to carry out its responsibilities under the legal provisions of the 
central government. It is therefore very important to monitor the 
development of local finance in transition countries and in transferring 
experiences from countries with higher fiscal decentralization to countries 
which are pre-accesion candidates to EU. Countries with higher fiscal 
decentralization are more acceptable bycountries that are recently new 
members of the European Union under similar region. In this study, a 
parallel overview of the local finances of new member country in the EU, 
Slovenia and pre-accesion candidate country to the EU i.e. Macedonia, was 
taken. 
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Introduction 
         This study makes a comparison between tax structure and the level of 
local fiscal autonomy. It analyzes the system of financial revenues, 
expenditures, and equalization which is an important parameter for revenue 
mobilization which is the lower correlation between normative local and 
central level. This review gives reliable comparative data on municipal 
finances and intergovernmental fiscal relations in Macedonia and Slovenia. 
        Macedonia is one of the countries where the Fiscal decentralisation 
system began in 2005. However, it was not accomplished due to the 
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comparsion with Slovenia where the local finance system has a higher 
decentralization function, and even some parameter are the same in the share 
of local government finance as percentage of GDP. The share of local 
finance in Slovenian municipalities amounts to about 5-7% of the GDP (EU 
around 12%) with currently 211 municipalities. Comparing the results with 
that of Macedonia, there are 81 municipalities. Thus, LG finance are around 
5% of GDP which are the main challenges that makes local governments 
finances differ in these two countries. Nevertheless, at local levels, both 
countries differ in terms of the development, which are the positive sides of a 
state that is already a member of the EU. 
 In particular, we are yet to obtain good data on the distribution of 
revenues and expenditures across local governments of different sizes and 
types. This is problematic because in many countries, revenues and 
investment expenditures are heavily skewed towards wealthier jurisdictions, 
particularly in the capital cities. In this study, the first step was taken towards 
filling and presenting the narrative description of each country’s financial 
systems. 
 Nonetheless, the report provides a reasonably clear picture of the 
structure, functions, and financing of local governments in Macedonia and 
Slovenia. Furthermore, it also provides an overview of how 
intergovernmental financial relations have evolved economically over the 
period of 2009-2013. This study begins with a review of the structure and 
functions of municipal governments in Macedonia and Slovenia’s 
municipalities, as well a few key macro-economic indicators. It presents 
comparative indicators of the fiscal decentralization of the states in general, 
and focuses on the main changes that have occurred in the local government 
finance systems of each country.  
 
Data and Methodological Issues 
        Comparing intergovernmental finance systems varies substantially from 
country to country. Municipal governments constitute the most important 
level of democratically elected sub-sovereign governance in the region when 
measured in fiscal terms.  
 Throughout South East Europe, municipalities and communes bear 
the primary responsibility of maintaining and improving local public 
infrastructure. This includes local roads, bridges, and parks, as well as water 
supply and sewage treatment, garbage collection and disposal, public 
lighting, local public transport, and district heating. In most of the region, 
network infrastructure has been neglected or underfunded for decades, and 
environmental sustainable facilities are only beginning to be built.   
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 The most important differences in what municipal governments do, 
concerns the degree to which they are responsible for social sector services, 
particularly education.  
 In Macedonia, local governments are responsible for financing and 
managing primary and secondary education, including the payment of 
teachers’ wages. While in Slovenia, local governments are responsible for 
maintaining and improving school facilities.  
 The population statistics used in this report is based on the last 
official census used by the relevant statistical agencies. In these countries, 
the population numbers currently used to allocate intergovernmental grants 
and transfers are significantly higher than the ones generated by the recent 
censuses.   
 The GDP numbers used are those used from the data provided by the 
Ministries of Finance according to the production method. Converted into 
EUR for comparative purposes, we used the average annual exchange rates 
provided by the Central Banks.  
 To compare the relative importance of local governments across 
settings, we used revenues --and not expenditures-- as a share of the 
consolidated finances of the General Government. By General Government 
revenue, we mean the total revenues of the national government and its 
agencies, including the revenues of off-budget (social security) funds and 
those of subnational governments. For local governments, we have excluded 
proceeds from borrowing, and have included income from asset sales and 
carry-overs from previous years.  
 In most of the region, local governments receive freely disposable 
(unconditional) General Grants from their central governments. These grants 
are defined by law as percentages of national taxes. But so long as the funds 
are allocated by formula, we consider them to be grants and not shared taxes. 
Consequently, we use the term Shared Taxes only for national taxes that are 
shared with local governments in an origin basis.  
 Throughout South-East Europe, local governments receive grants 
from higher level governments that can only be spent for specific purposes. 
In some cases, these grants should be considered as block grants, meaning 
grants that can only be spent on a specific function (e.g. education). 
 In most of the region, local governments are entitled to shares of 
national taxes generated in their jurisdictions. However, the most important 
shared tax is usually the Personal Income Tax (PIT).  
 The data on local own-revenues in the region is often poorly 
maintained and classified. These revenues include income from locally 
imposed taxes; the sale or rental of municipal assets; fines, penalties, and 
interest; local user fees and charges; and fees for permits, licenses, and the 
issuance of civil registration documents. In some places, local user fees and 
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taxes --though collected by local governments-- are defined by higher level 
governments and should be considered as shared revenues. The most 
important local tax is typically the Property Tax, though it is not often the 
single-largest source of local own-revenue.  
 
Numbers and Types of Sub-sovereign Levels of Governance in 
Macedonia and Slovenia 
 Municipal governments in Slovenia are also relatively small with an 
average of less than 10,000 inhabitants. The small size of the first tier of the 
local governments in these places presents obstacles to decentralization 
because small jurisdictions often have weak tax bases, and lack the human 
capital necessary to reasonably support major public services. 
 But on the whole, the average size of local governments in the region 
is larger than the average size for the EU as a whole, and the EU. Macedonia, 
all have municipal governments with an average population which is greater 
than 15,000 inhabitants.  
 One reason for the relatively large average size of municipal 
governments in South-East Europe is that the percentage of people living in 
capital cities is higher than the average size of the EU.  
Table 1: Levels, Types, and Numbers of Sub-Sovereign Governments 
Population Distribution and Density 
 One consequence of this oversized importance of capital cities in the 
region is that tax bases tend to be skewed toward one major urban area. This 
creates technical and political obstacles to decentralization. Technically, it is 
difficult to assign local governments robust own-revenues or to create 
efficient equalization mechanisms when a disproportionate share of the 
economy is concentrated in a single city. Politically, it can make equalization 
difficult by setting the interests of all other jurisdictions against the capital.   
  
NALAS 
Member 
Levels of 
Sub-
Sovereign 
Government 
Types of Sub-Sovereign Government 
# of 
1st 
Tier 
Macedonia ZELS 1 Municipalities (Neighborhood Units) 81 
Slovenia SOG 1 Municipalities 211 
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Chart 1. Percentage of Population Living in the Capital City
 
The Dynamics of the Gross Domestic Product 
 Chart 2 presents the GDP per capita for the countries from 2005 and 
2013. Not surprisingly, there are very significant variations in relative to 
wealth across the group. Slovenia is by far the richest, with GDP per capita 
of 17,186 EUR.  GDP growth in Slovenia (14%) was the slowest during the 
period, though it is slightly higher than the average for the EU (9%).  
Chart 2 GDP Per Capita 2006 vs. 2013 
 
 
 Table 2 below presents the annual changes in the GDP for the 
countries between 2006 and 2013. There is considerable variation in the 
economy as all were hit by the crisis fairly hard. Since 2009, growth has 
been uneven. Indeed, most of the region fell back into recession in 2012. 
However, Slovenia and Macedonia are still in the doldrums, and in Turkey, 
economic growth has slowed down.  
Table 2 Annual GDP Growth and Decline from 2006-2012 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Slovenia 5.8 6.9 3.6 -8.0 1.4 0.7 -2.5 -0.1% 
Macedonia 5.0 6.1 5.0 -0.9 2.9 2.8 -0.3 -2.2% 
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Indicators of Fiscal Decentralization  
          The most common indicators of the relative importance of local 
governments in a country’s overall governance structure are local public 
revenues (or expenditures) in relationship to the GDP and in relationship to 
the total public revenues (or expenditures). To interpret their significance, 
however, we also need to know how large the total public sector is in relation 
to the GDP, and what public services have been assigned to local 
governments. If a country’s public sector is small, it is unlikely that local 
government revenues will represent a significant share of the GDP. They 
may, however, represent a substantial share of the total public revenues. 
Such a situation would suggest that all the levels of government have trouble 
collecting taxes, but that the national government is treating local 
governments relatively fairly. In contrast, if a country’s public sector is large, 
but the local government revenues is low as both a share of GDP and total 
public revenues, then this suggests that the national government is not 
treating local governments seriously. It is also important to understand 
whether or not local governments are responsible for delivering significant 
services in the areas of education, health, and social welfare. This is because 
these functions are so costly that assigning them to local governments really 
changes the nature of the intergovernmental finance game. For example, in 
most OECD countries, the full costs of pre-university education are usually 
equal to between 3 and 5% of GDP and 12 and 20% of total public 
expenditure, of which 60 to 80% goes for teachers’ wages1.  
 In Macedonia, municipalities pay teachers salaries which are 3% 
from GDP. But in Slovenian municipalities, they are not responsible for 
paying teachers salaries.  
 Table 3 summarizes the social sector functions that have been 
assigned to local governments. In Macedonia, local governments are fully 
responsible for pre-tertiary education, including paying the wages of 
                                                          
1 See Education at Glance, OECD Paris 2013, pp 193, 218, 240-48. 
5,8 
6,9 
3,6 
-8 
1,4 0,7 
-2,5 
-0,1 0 
6,1 
5 
-0,9 
2,9 2,8 
-0,3 
-2,2 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Slovenia
Macedonia
European Scientific Journal May 2015 edition vol.11, No.13  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
525 
teachers. By all rights, local governments in these countries should have 
higher revenues both as a share of GDP and of total public revenues than 
other members of the group.  
Table 3: Social Sector Functions of 1st Tier Local Governments 
  Preschools 
Primary 
Schools 
Secondary 
Schools 
Primary 
Health 
Secondary 
Health 
  
Buildi
ngs 
Wag
es 
Buildi
ngs 
Wag
es 
Buildi
ngs 
Wag
es 
Buildi
ngs 
Wag
es 
Buildi
ngs 
Wag
es 
Macedo
nia XX XX XX XX XX XX         
Slovenia XX XX XX        XX       
 
Republic of Macedonia 
 As a result of the Ohrid Agreements of 2001, and as part of the 
country’s effort to accede to the European Union, changes were made in the 
laws of the Local Government. 
 Macedonia reduced the number of its local governments from 124 to 
85 in 2005, and then to 81 in 2013 as a result of the changes in the Law for 
territorial organization. In 2007, local governments that had cleared 
outstanding arrears and that met other criteria for good financial management 
were allowed to enter the so-called Second Phase of decentralization. Most 
importantly, they assumed the responsibility for running primary and 
secondary schools as well as some cultural and social welfare institutions 
from 2005. To fund these tasks, they began to receive block grants from the 
national government from 2007. As of today, only one municipality has not 
entered into the Second Phase of decentralization.  
 Macedonian municipalities are now responsible for maintaining and 
improving local infrastructure, water and wastewater treatment, public 
hygiene, public lighting, local public transport, fire protection as well as for 
preschool, primary and secondary education, local cultural institutions 
(Cultural Houses, libraries, and museums), and elderly care. 
 In accordance with the Law on Local Government Finance, local 
governments derive their revenues from the following sources: 
• Own-Revenues, including the Property Tax, other local fees, charges 
and taxes, asset income, and income from fines, penalties, and 
donations. 
• Shared Taxes, particularly a share of the income tax coming from 
artisans. 
• A General Grant, which is defined as a percentage of the national 
yield of the Value Added Tax and allocated by formula. 
• Block Grants from the national budget for primary and secondary 
education, culture, and social welfare. 
• Earmarked grants for special programs or specific investments 
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• Debt Finance & Donations 
 In 2005, local government revenues as percentage of GDP were equal 
to only 1.9% of the GDP. Due to the decentralization process, it had tripled 
to more than 6.5% of GDP by 2012, while by 2013, the share was only 
5,88% of GDP.   
 Despite this growth, however, Macedonian municipalities still face 
profound financial challenges. In order to strengthen their finances, the 
Municipal Association of Macedonia (ZELs) has lobbied for amendments of 
the local government finance law. This lobbying has resulted in the 
following recent changes:  
• The percentage of the national yield of VAT earmarked for the 
General Grant was increased from 3% to 4.5%; (in accordance with 
the requirements of ZELS, the Central Governmet has committed that 
in its mandate, they will increase the percentage of VAT to 6%), 
which means that we expect an increase in revenue from this 
resource. 
• The municipal share of income from the sale of state-owned was 
increased to 80%. 
• The municipal share of income from minerals concession was 
increased to 78%  
• The municipal share of revenue from other concessions (water) will 
be increased from 25% to 50% in 2016.  
• Revenues from fees to wash and separate gravel are now split 50/50. 
• Revenues from fees for legalizing illegal structures on agricultural 
lands are now split 50%/50%. 
• Revenues from fees for legalizing buildings on urban land now go 
entirely to municipalities.  
• Local governments may now borrow from the commericial lenders as 
well as from the national government, and the World Bank. 
• Starting from the year 2015, the municipalities will recieve money 
from concessions on agricultural land; 10% in 2015; and in 2018, 
revenues will be shared 50:50. 
 
Equalization Instruments  
 The criteria used to allocate the General Grant have an equalizing 
effect. The size of the General Grant is anchored by law at 4.5% of the 
national yield of VAT. The criteria to allocate the grant are defined by an 
annual ordinance of the government according to the following rules: 
• All jurisdictions receive a lump sum payment of 3 million denars. 
• The costs of these payments are deducted from the grant pool and the 
residual is then divided between the capital city of Skopje and its 
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composite jurisdictions (12%), on the one hand and all other 
municipalities (88%) on the other hand. 
• The share of funds for municipalities outside of the capital is divided 
by a formula which allocates 65% of the pool on the basis of 
population; 27% on the basis of square kilometers; and 8% on the 
basis of the number of settlement. 
 The allocation of block grants also has implications for equalization. 
The allocation of the education grant is governed by an annual ordinance 
which determines the amount of funds each local government will get for 
pupils enrolled in primary and secondary school and for pupils with special 
needs. The formula for determining these per pupil payments however are 
publicly available, but the amount of money that the Municiplaities gets is 
not enough. Thus, it needs to increase from the Central budget that 
determines this competence, whose per pupil costs are now substantially 
higher than average. 
 The allocation of the block grant for preschool education is also 
governed by an annual ordinance. The formula in this ordinance contains 
variables for the number of pupils in the school, for the type of heating in the 
school, the duration of the heating system, the number of teachers in the 
school, and the utilization rate of the facility. Municipalities that have 
cultural institution receive a block grant for culture, based on the number of 
employees working in the institutions covered by the grant; the total square 
meters of the concerned buildings; and the coefficients for the particular 
types of cultural services these institutions are providing. As with other block 
grants, the rules governing the allocation of the grant for culture is 
determined by an annual ordinance of the national government. 
 There is also a fund for balanced regional development which 
allocates money to regions according to a formula contained in the Law on 
Regional Development. By Law, this fund should be equal to 1% of the 
GDP, but so far, this has not been the case.   
 
Republic of Slovenia 
 In the first years of the financial crisis, Slovenian municipalities did 
not suffer from the overall downturn. But in 2011, municipal revenue 
declined by 5.5% and the total expenditure fell to 9%. In 2012, because of 
the persistence of the crisis, Parliament adopted austerity measures which 
also affected municipalities. On the revenue side, the national government 
reduced the needed calculation for determining the amount of shared taxes 
going to local governments by 3.7%. It also froze the national government’s 
share of investment co-financing to the already reduced levels of the 
previous year.  On the expenditure side, the austerity measures included a 
reduction in the wages of public servants. But there was also an increase in 
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some social transfers. As a result, municipal expenditures decreased by less 
than 1%. 
 In 2012, the Government and the municipal associations signed an 
agreement to further reduce the needed indicator use to calculate shared 
taxes in 2013 and 2014, essentially forcing municipalities to lower 
expenditures. In 2013, additional fiscal consolidation efforts placed new 
expenditure burdens on municipalities. These included an increase in the 
VAT rate, a rise in social transfers, and a further reduction in the co-
financing of local government investment by the national government. 
Consequently, only the state-mandated reduction of public sector wages 
worked in the opposite direction.  
 At the end of 2013, the national government adopted a new Law on 
Real Estate Taxation. The Law eliminates the Land Use Fee, a charge that 
formerly was completely under municipal control and which generated 9% 
of the local revenue. The Law also transformed the Property Tax into a 
shared tax that will be fully administered by the national government, and 
whose yield will be divided 50/50 between local governments and the state. 
Municipalities will no longer have the right to determine the base of the tax 
or to make exemptions, though they will retain the right to set the rate within 
centrally set norms. The new Law on Real-Estate Taxation thus significantly 
reduces the fiscal autonomy of municipalities.  
 The fiscal pressures generated by the financial crisis have also led to 
the proposals in consolidating local governments in order to improve the 
economic efficiency of the public sector. The Ministry of the Interior, the 
competent authority for local governments, has stated that there are too many 
small municipalities with limited governance capacities. In the summer of 
2013, the Ministry proposed a territorial reform that would have eliminated 
all municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants in 2014, reducing the 
number of municipalities from 212 to 122. After protests by mayors and 
criticism of the proposal by municipalities, the associations, and independent 
experts, the proposal was withdrawn. Instead, the Ministry promised to 
develop a more strategic approach to territorial reform that would include 
objective analysis, wide discussion, and consultation. This strategic approach 
is expected to be completed by 2018. 
 The overall size of the local government sector in Slovenia increased 
from about 5% of the GDP in 2006 to close to 6% of the GDP in 2009. Thus, 
it has remained at this level since then. This suggests that the national 
government has been distributing the costs of the economic adjustment 
reasonably fairly between the levels of government.  
 Slovenian local governments are heavily dependent on PIT sharing 
for most of their revenues, and since 2007, free disposable equalization 
grants that provide additional revenues to poorer local governments have 
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been reduced. Instead, weaker local governments are given additional 
increments of PIT.   
 Local own-revenues have performed roughly in line with the 
economy as a whole. Slovenian municipalities derive an unusually large 
share of their revenues from asset sales and rentals. The yield of the Property 
Tax has been significant, but with no clear upward trend. The 2013 
elimination of the Land Use Fee and the centralization of the Property Tax 
will obviously reduce both local government revenues and their fiscal 
autonomy if not accompanied by other reforms. 
 In 2011 and 2012, the investment rate of Slovenian local 
governments dropped from about 45% of total spending to about 36%, which 
is still high for the region.  Wage spending is remarkably low, while 
subsidies to companies are surprisingly high. This suggests that at least some 
wage spending is being carried out by off-budget service providers that need 
municipal subsidies to pay their wage bills.  
 Furthermore, Slovenia has combined robust local investment with 
low wage spending and modest property tax yields. The yield of the property 
tax as a share of GDP has declined from 0.64% of GDP to 0.5% 
 
Local Governments Revenues in South-East Europe 
 Chart 3 shows local government revenues as a share of total public 
revenues and of GDP, as well as the average for the EU. As can be seen from 
the Chart, local governments in the EU play --on average-- a substantially 
larger role than countries like Macedonia.  
 The Macedonian municipalities have public sectors that are smaller 
than the EU average. As in local governments in Macedonia, they are fully 
responsible for financing and managing pre-tertiary education, including 
paying teachers’ wages.  
 While local governments in Bulgaria and Macedonia are only 
receiving about 15% of all public revenues (or 6% of GDP). This strongly 
suggests that the national governments of Macedonia are underfunding local 
governments in general, and pre-tertiary education in particular. As a result, 
they fail to meet their obligations under the European Charter of Local Self-
Governments. 
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Chart 3. Local Government Revenue as Share of GDP and Total Public Revenue in 2013 
 
*indicates that local governments pay teachers wages. 
 
 Local governments in Slovenia, have revenues equal to between 5.3 
and 7.0% of GDP (14-18% of public revenues). This is low by EU standards. 
At the same time, local governments in Slovenia both maintain preschools 
and pay the wages of preschool teachers. However, this was a significant 
expense particularly in urban jurisdictions with high enrollment rates.  
 Finally, it is important to note that while this Chart provides more 
useful information about the overall importance of local governments within 
the group, it does not provide us with information about how these revenues 
are distributed across local governments. In addition, it does not provide how 
much autonomy local governments have in actually spending them.  
 Chart 4 shows local government revenues as the percentage of GDP 
in 2006, 2009, and 2013. In Slovenia, the local government revenues have 
been more stable, rising or falling marginally over the entire period. Only in 
Macedonia, has the revenue position of local governments significantly 
improved over the entire period.   
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Chart 4: Local Government Revenue as a Share of GDP in 2006 – 2013 in Macedonia 
and Slovenia 
 
*indicates that local governments pay teachers wages. 
 
 Chart 5 shows the per capita revenues of the consolidated public 
sector and of the local governments in EUR in 2010. The Chart is a useful 
reminder of how much poorer the government of most South-East Europe 
are, when compared to those of the EU, as well as how much variation that is 
across the region. It is particularly striking that local governments in 
Macedonia are paying for both basic services and teachers’ wages with per 
capita revenues of less than 250 EUR. Indeed, it seems that decentralization 
has been pushed farther among the poorer members of the group, than 
among the more wealthy. Thus, this suggest that at least in some cases, it has 
been driven less by the desire to empower local governments than by the 
desire of central governments to relieve themselves of the responsibility of 
reasonably financing public services.  
Chart 5 Consolidated Public Revenue and Local Government Revenue in Per Capita 
EUR in 2013 
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The Chart is also useful when read in conjunction with Chart 5. For 
example, Macedonian local governments have per capita revenues which are 
very small compared to those of their Slovenian counterparts or compared 
with the EU municipalities. However, they pay teachers’ wages while the 
Slovenians do not.  
 
Basic Composition of Local Government Revenues 
 Chart 6 shows the basic composition of local government revenues in 
2013. Unfortunately, this data is less comparable than it should be because of 
differences in the classification schemes used by members of the group. In 
some places, shared taxes are presented as own-revenues or grants, while in 
other cases, own revenues (from PIT surcharges) are presented as shared 
taxes.  
Chart 6 Composition of Local Government Revenue in 2013 
 
 
Similarly, the equalization system in Slovenia gives additional 
increments of PIT to poorer jurisdictions. These additional PIT increments 
function like equalization “grants”, but again cannot be distinguished from 
shared taxes. Finally, many of the revenues that are classified as own-
revenues are in fact fees and charges set by higher-level governments (and 
sometimes collected by them), but whose yields goes entirely to the local 
government.  
 
Financial Independence of Local Governments  
 Nonetheless, Chart 7 does provide some basic information about the 
financial independence of local governments. In Macedonia, local 
governments have limited financial autonomy because more than 50% of 
their revenues come from conditional grants education functions. Here, 
national governments have a legitimate interest in making sure that the 
money intended for these social sector functions is actually spent on them. 
Nonetheless, it is one thing for national governments to want to make sure 
that monies earmarked for health and education are actually spent on them, 
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and quite another thing for them to control exactly how local governments 
use these funds within a sector. And unfortunately, it is probably fair to say 
that in most places, social sector block grants are over regulated.  
 More generally, there is no use of PIT sharing in Macedonia that 
makes extremely limited use of it. This is surprising since the origin based 
sharing of PIT is not only clearly popular in the region, but has formed a 
critical pillar of the intergovernmental finance systems of virtually all the 
post-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004. It is also interesting 
that in 2013, local governments in Slovenia received no income from 
unconditional grants. But in Macedonia, unconditional grants accounted for 
less than 10% of the total revenue. The absence or relative insignificance of 
unconditional grants raises questions about the equity of these country’s 
intergovernmental finances systems. This is because it is generally through 
unconditional grants that central governments provide additional revenues to 
poorer jurisdictions. Nonetheless, unconditional grants can be allocated in 
many ways and their simple existence should not be taken to mean that they 
are effectively redistributing national income. Moreover, and as we have 
already mentioned, Slovenia do at least some equalization through other 
mechanisms.  
 Chart 7 presents the composition of own-revenues for local 
governments ranked by the share of these revenues in total revenues. In some 
cases, the reporting is quite detailed and contains more categories than are 
presented in the Chart. In others, only two or three categories are used and it 
is difficult to say what these categories contain. Similarly, revenues from the 
sale or rental of municipal assets are frequently presented as Communal 
Fees.  
Chart 7. Composition of Own-Revenue 2013 
 
 
 What can be said is that in Slovenia, the property tax is much higher 
compared to Macedonian municipalities, the composition of own-revenues, 
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from the rental and sale of assets is surprisingly important, as is revenue 
from quasi-fiscal charges imposed on new development, charges that 
governments are trying to roll back throughout the region. In the region, 
own-source revenues are disproportionally concentrated in capital cities and 
typically tied very strongly to the real-estate market through land 
development fees, construction permits, the Property Transfer Tax, and the 
Property Tax. 
 Table 4 below shows the per capita yield of the property tax in 2006 
and 2013 for all NALAS members. As can be seen from the Table, there are 
very significant differences across the group in both the yield of the tax and 
its growth over the last seven years. The situation in Slovenia is similar, but 
of a much higher base.  In Macedonia, the yield of the tax has increased 
almost fourfold, but still amounts to only 8 Eur per capita.  
Table 4: Change in Per Capita Yield of the Property Tax in EUR 2006 vs. 2013 
  2006 2013 % + or - 
Slovenia (2012) 92.0 92.0 0% 
Macedonia 1.6 7.8 385% 
 
 Table 5 presents the same basic information but expresses the yield 
of the tax as a percentage of GDP and includes the average for the EU. What 
the Table shows is that in Slovenia, the expansion of the property tax did not 
keep up with GDP growth while it exceeded it in Macedonia.   
Table 5 Change in Property Tax as a Percentage of GDP 2006 vs. 2013 
  2006 2013 % + or - 
Macedonia 0.06% 0.21% 253% 
Slovenia (2012) 0.61% 0.54% -12% 
 
 This suggests that there is a division within the states between places 
where local governments are more aggressively using the property tax and 
places where they are not. The yield of the tax exceeds the EU average of 
1.1% of GDP (And the EU average is low when compared to North America, 
Australia, France, and some of the Nordic countries where the tax accounts 
are between 2 and 3% of GDP.) 
 Given the evident difficulties across the region (and much of the EU) 
in making the property tax a robust source of revenue, it is probably 
unrealistic to expect it to serve as the foundation for the financial 
independence of local governments in South-East Europe.  Nonetheless, 
there is a clear room for improvement.  
 
Local Government Investment Spending 
 Chart 8 shows the composition of local government expenditures by 
economic type as the average for the EU (EU 28). The data should be treated 
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with caution because there are differences in the way countries report 
expenditures as well as problems by extracting fully comparable data from 
Eurostat. For example, some places treat capital transfers to public utilities as 
investment expenditures, while others record them as subsidies. There is also 
a tendency to record wage spending as the purchase of goods and services 
for EU 28 transfers that includes only operating subsidies to public utilities.  
Chart 8 Composition of Local Government Expenditure in 2013 
 
 
 Nonetheless, the most striking feature of the Chart is that local 
governments in most of South-East Europe spend a larger share of their 
budgets on investment than their counterparts within the EU. It is hard to say 
how much this reflects the fact that across the region, local governments 
often pay for investments in public utilities; but elsewhere, utilities finance 
themselves through tariffs. It should also be noted that in some places in the 
region, investment rates would be substantially higher (e.g. Serbia) if the 
data on local government transfers to public utilities distinguished between 
operating and capital subsidies.  
 The differences in the average investment rates for the three groups 
(SEE, EU28, and EU7) have been remarkably consistent over the last 8 
years. This suggests that local governments in South-East Europe, like those 
of the EU7 are playing an extraordinary spending as much they can, to 
modernize the run-down infrastructure they have inherited. Local 
governments in South-East Europe are working harder than their 
counterparts in most of the EU to build new infrastructure because they are 
spending higher proportions of their income on investment, despite receiving 
significantly lower shares of public revenue – measured either as a 
percentage of  GDP or of total public revenues (Chart 4). But while 
investment rates in the region have been comparatively robust, it is important 
to remember that we do not know how much these rates have been driven-up 
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by a few wealthier jurisdictions and by the (likely) imbalances in the region’s 
intergovernmental finance systems.  
 EU funds are undoubtedly playing an important role in the 
modernization of local public infrastructure in new member states. In 
some cases, they have also allowed national policy makers to substitute 
transfers from the EU for transfers generated from domestic sources.  
Chart 9. Local Investment in EUR Per Capita (2013) 
 
 
 Indeed, local government investment as a share of GDP has exceeded 
both the average for the EU 28 and the EU7 in Slovenia. 
 Local government investment spending as a percentage of GDP is 
extremely low in Macedonia. Local government investment as a share of 
GDP remains lower than the average for the new EU. Thus, this is below 
what one might reasonably hope to see, given the catch-up game that local 
governments in South-East Europe must do.  
 Looking briefly at the composition of public investment by the level 
of government, Chart 12 shows total public investment as a share of GDP 
divided by the level of governments for the year 2006-2013. There is 
significant variation in both total public investment and its composition 
across levels of government. In general, total public investment in the South 
East Europe states are higher than for the more established member states of 
the EU. This is not surprising, given the game of catch-up they are all 
playing.  
Chart 10 Public Investment as a Percentage of GDP by Level of Government 
(average 2006-2013) 
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Similarly, a larger share of this public investment comes from central 
governments in most of South-East Europe, than it does in either the EU 28 
or the new EU 7. Again, this is not terribly surprising. Nonetheless, it is 
striking that in most of the region, local public investment as a share of GDP 
remains lower than in the EU 7, whose members faced similar deficits in 
costly environmental and network infrastructure. At the same time, it is 
worth pointing out that in at least some members of the group, local 
government are accounting for a healthy share of total public investment, 
both in relationship to the GDP as a whole, and to the central government 
(Slovenia). 
 
Conclusion 
 Decentralization in South-East Europe is still a work in progress. 
This is because there is no country in the region where local government 
revenues or expenditures reaches the average for the EU either as a 
percentage of GDP or of total public revenues. 
 Since 2009, local governments have done an impressive job in 
mobilizing own source revenues. Though the overall yield of the property tax 
remains modest, they have increased collection five times. They are also 
more argressively collecting Land Development Fees, Lighting Fees, and 
other communal charges.  
 The share of local expenditures going to wages has increased steadily 
as local governments have assumed the responsibility for primary and 
secondary education. Despite this wage growth, they have maintained 
respectable investment rates. Wage and investment spending as a share of 
GDP have expanded significiantly over the last eight years, while the 
property tax has increased more modestly and still only yielding revenue 
equal to 0.21% of GDP. 
 The share of local public investment in total public investment as 
increased from about 20% between 2006 and 2009 to about 40% between 
2010 and 2013. 
 Of all the countries in the region, Macedonia has undergone the most 
structural change over the last eight years. This change has been driven by 
the progressive decentralization of major social sector functions to local 
governments particularly primary and secondary schools.  
 This process has significantly increased local revenue as a share of 
both GDP and of total public revenue. EU funds are playing an important 
role in the modernization of local public infrastructure in new member states, 
and even in pre-accession countries. 
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